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I.  The  European  Mo~etary System did not enter into force on 
1 January,  and  I  find this regrettable.  But,  however great  my 
disappointment,  I  remain convinced that this merely means  a 
delay.  The  economic  considerations and the political will that 
led to the decisions taken last Deqember still remain valid.  It 
' 
there is a  crisis, it is a  crisis of growth:  only rarely has 
major progress in the construction of Europe  been achieved free 
from  obstacles and  without friction,  and even though  I  am 
disappointed I  prefer the difficulties produced by movement  to 
the difficulties created by an eclipse of political inspiration. 
The  reasons for the delay that  has  occurred need .to  be  exncincd 
:from  the viewpoint  of the future management  of the system,  which 
will  be  demanding.  The  logic behind it is not 
purely monetary and it is not merely an intervention agree~ent 
between central banks;  to be  successful it must  be  the pivot of 
joint measures to bring our economies  more  clo£ely into line with 
regard to their objectives, behaviour and achieve:cents  • 
. 
• 
•. _...._ .......  ,,  ,  •  l 
II.  In this respect, the task which  lies before us is  i~~ense. 
The  ~reaty of Rome  h;s very little to say on monetary policy.  , 
With  a  view to promoting the coordination of V.cmber  Stateo' 
policies in this ti.eld, it z;a,inly provides for the establishment 
ot .,MonetaryCommittee with advisory status.  It also stipulates 
that each Member  State is to treat its exchanee  rate policy as a 
matter ot common  concern.  In the event ot balance of payments 
difficulties, it provides for safeguard clauses and  mutual  .. 
assistance.  Altogether, this takes up  only a  few  lines, very 
pneral in na.ture,  in a  chapter entitled ":Balance ot Payments". 
The  developments  which  have  taken place since then and which 
resulted in the decisions taken at the  Hague ·Summit on 
E:onomic and M:metary,  the Werner  Plan,  the Barre Pla::1,  the par-
tial establishment ot the "snake"  and then 
the  initiatives launched in 1977-78 were prompted by two  major 
considerations. 
!he first consideration is a  political one  and reflects the 
conviction that our countries have a  co~mon destiny.  The  idea 
ot European Union,  with'all its imprecision,  is the expression 
ot this aspiration, and Economic and Monetary Union the key 
. 
instrument.  t 
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The  second  consideration is ~uch more  practical and of much  mo~e 
immediate  significance.  It  ste::~s  from  two  prcmiccs  :  that 
monetary instability constitutes a  major threat to our  econo::~ies, 
and  that to put an end to such  instability,  we  must  begin by 
establishing in Eurppe,  bet~een highly interdependent nnd 
institutionally linked economies,  a  zone  of monetary stability. 
A more  detailed analysis of this argument  reveals that it has a 
vhole series or components:  •  .. 
Firstly, there is considerable disappointment  with the negative 
impact  of the system of floating exchange  rates on  interr4tional 
competition,  market  and profit expectations,  the growth  in 
investment  Rnd,  lastly,  gr•:,~~th  o.nd  employment.  The  ab:::er.ce  of' 
monetary rules has very se:l'icmo  practical  implicatior::J  ar..d  also 
a  psychological  impact  since it e.ff<ects the ability of  cc:::~.::~.nies 
and ot economic  agents generally to plan ahead,  and since it 
undermines  confidence. 
Secondly,  there is fear about  the future of the European Common  Ma'c~.rc•t 
which  is faced with a  monetary and  economic  crisis that  ~ight 
(1' acqilis communautairc) 
jeopardize its achievements to date/and,  more  generally, a  fear 
that the principle of freedom  in international trade cay not  be 
upheld"' 
. 
• 
Thirdly, at a  time when  our interdependence is self-evident  (we 
transact between ourselves half of our aggregate  fo~eign tra~e), 
i- ..  ~  -· ...... ···- .... ··-··-·  ..........  _ -·-···  ....... -- ·-0  ---
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there ie an  awareness  of the limits to economic  policy coordination 
that  ie based  on  good  will alone;  hence  the need  to secure  a  sO\Uld 
and  sufficiently stringent basis for the restoration of econooic 
order and  a  rovival or growth ~  relying on the key  role  pl~ed ~ 
the monetary constraint, which acts both direct~ and  as a  catalyst 
tor other policies.  The  construction of Europe,  which  has been 
made  too exclusively dependent  on the good  will shown by l·:e::ber 
States, needs firmer anchoring points  • 
. 
L&atl.y,there is the force ot our  commort  interests in detercini:g the 
nev pattern of international economic  and  monetar,y relationships. 
In abort,  the world  is thirsting for stability;  Europe  needs it 
more  than any  other area,  am  it must  z:ake  a  start on  c:reatir.g £'.4ch 
etability by  accepting the constraints and  common  disciplines that 
go  with it. 
III.  Prom  these considerations,  or rather facts,  has  be~~ to develop, 
helped by the Commission  of the European Communities,  a  political 
conviction that has found  practical expression in the policy 
guidelines adopted at the  meetir~ of the European  Cou.~cil in 
Copenhagen  and  Eremen  and  subsequently in the decisions taken at the 
meeting ot the European CoWlCil  in Erussels  • 
. 
t 
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What  baa  the work  that has been  goir~ on for almost nine 
montba  achieved?  I  shall attempt to answer  this although I 
am  perfectly aware  that, as it stands at present,  the European 
Xonetar,y  System: 
"' 
(1)  bring3 together both concrete mechanisms  and  potential 
measures,  so that a  full appraisal can be  mad~ only on 
the basis of experience  and  in the light of how  we  will 
fit in the details and  meet  some  of the conditions it 
imposes; 
.. . 
(11)  is merely the forerunner  of a  genuine monetar,y  Eystem 
and  does  not feature,  even in their nascent form,  all 
the  necessa.~ elements; 
(iii)  will not be  judged solelY on  its own  merits but also on 
its contribution tow~-ds strengthening the  international 
:monc;,ta.ry  system,  a  monetary  system th3.t it can h6l:i) to 
improve  but that will a.lso  e.ffect its own  chances of 
. 
• 
' 
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IV.  The  exchant~ rate system adopted in Dece~ber, while no 
leaa strict than the "snake",  is  different from it. 
Rather than describing it in detail, the simplest thing for 
me  to do  would be to highlight its main  features by  outlining 
ita obJectives and the rr.a.chinery  to be used to tackle any 
strains which  might  affect it. 
The  firnt objective is to  ~aintain real stability in the 
relntionships between the  currencies participating in the 
system 
.. 
{a) In order to do  this, any two  Community  currencies will each 
have  a  maximum  permissible fluctuation margin of 2.25% against one  ~~other, 
with the exception of the lira, for which  the  ~argin Will be  6%.  Once 
the limit is reached,  intervention will be  automatic,  but here 
we  see the first difference with the "snake".  This lies in the 
scale and time-span of the  re~ources deployed to help ensure  that 
the maximum  divergence  limit is.not exceeded  and  also in their form 
since the  ~~CF will henceforth issue ECU  against the  depo~it by  the 
central banks  or 2o%  of their gold  and dollar reoervcs. 
In order to deal with ~  speculation,  the unlimited very short-term 
credit which central banks  make  available to one  ~~other is 
extended  from  30  to 45  dnyo  and will be  renewable  for  three months 
within certain limits.  Short-term credit m~  be  granted for nir.e 
months  instead or six months  as  in the present monetary  arr~~ent 
and  the amount  of 14  000  million ECU  actually available is core than  . 
t 
double  the  previous figure.  Both in real terms  and  as  a  me~~ cf 
dissuasion, this will considerably strengtbcnthe lines of defence 
for maintaining the quasi-stable parities which will be established. .... 
Community  e:~dium-term credit  c:;.chir.cry will be  strengthened  a.."ld  will 
have a  ceiling of  11  000  million ECU  as against 5 450  million ECU 
iod~.  This is an  improve~ent along the same  lines, though 
ita purpose will obviously be different.  Short-term credit is 
essential1Y a  means  of containing erratic move~ents on  the 
market.  It ceases to apply as soon as the situation returns 
to normal.  Medium-term credit can either take  over from 
'  •  111  f 
ahort-term support - thus avoiding any  immediate  drain on  the 
currency reserves of a  debtor country - or, as will more 
frequently be  the case, it can fulfil quite a  different role, 
that is to  say it can  enable a  V.ember  State which  pursues an  .. 
economic policy in line with the  co~~on interest  b~t which 
is in temporary balance of payments difficulties, to avoid the 
unnecessary constraints involved in the need to restore its 
e%ternal accounts too  rapid~. 
(b)  .A.  second line o.f'  defenc\:'1  in maintaining parit~es is the 
establishment of e.  prevent:iv()  system ba.:::cd  on the uze  of a 
divergence  indicator,  defined in relation to the E.CU,  i.e. 
ihe currency-basket unit of  ~~count. 
When  a  currency diverges,  that  is to say  when  it moves  away 
from  the ECU  by more  than a  certain percentage,  there will be 
a  presumption that the relevant country will take action. 
Notice that I  use the word  action, which  is a  broad term,  and 
not  the word  intervention.  This  arrange~ent was  included in 
the  system  so as to deal with the problem of the  involunta.~  . 
t 
debtor or creditor,  i.e. to  iL~ose on  a  countr,y whose  currency 
was  reearded as pulling the other currencies upwards  or 
downwards  a  more  specific resp,onsibili  ty in easing tensions  • 
...  ~---~  .......... -~  ....  --- ........ ___  ....  - •  ..  •  - ~·:  ..  ~;,  :  ',•  •••••  # ............  .  ...... ........ ______  .... -----"···~  ~--~  -·- ·--.  ---
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Jovever,  I  feel that the new  mechanism will help to change,  in a 
veey desirable V<J;J,  the nature of the European monetary syotec by 
means  which have little to do with the problem of the  invol~tary 
4ebtor. 
•  "  0  t' 
F1r1t of all, ae  I  have  said, it introduces the.very de~irable 
notion of prevention into the  system - a  new  notion and  one  w~ich 
m~  make  our machinery more  flexible  and core effective at less 
overall cost.  This  p1·eventive  action will be  accomp3.11icd,  'Where 
necessar,y,  by diversification of the  intervention currencies,  C~ity 
currencies  o~ non-member  currencies,  thereby ensuring that the 
measures taken are better adapted to the market situation. 
Second~, the divergence indicator concept  gives  the  systc~ a 
further characteristic:  its use makes  it necessary to investig::J.te 
the causes of the strains which appear  on the foreign  exchar~ ~::J.rket 
at a  given time.  It induces the authorities to act in the  light of 
these causes  and not  simp~ - and  automatically - by  v~chcsir~ or 
selling foreign exchange with a  view to maintaining the spread between 
tvo currencies vithin certain limits. 
These strains m~  stem from  very different sources,  necessitating very 
different corrective action.  They  m~  stem from  the  system itself: 
from  the short-term weakness  of a  currency or from  a  reaction to 
a  policy - perhaps  a  monetary P.olicy -which the market  jt:.d.~s to be 
incompatible with the ttainteita."lce  of the parity chosen,  or r:.cy  eve.n  be  a 
judgment  on what  is now  seen to be  an unsuitable parity.  T~ey ~::J.Y  have 
an external origin:  the weakening or, alternatively,  the  strer~her.ir.c of 
a  major non-member  currency {such as the dollar) acting on the whole  of 
the European monetary  system through the pressure of available  li~dity 
on one  ot our currencies. 
---- ··-~--------...-.-· ~ ·-
-9-
Consequently, the remedies will theccelves change:  it will not 
simply be  a  question of intervention - however  diversified - on 
the exchange  market.  It mt:J3  be ncceosary to take mc<l.Sures  of 
domestic monetary policy or to rethink overall econacio policy 
or to chan£8  the central rate. 
"' 
This diversification of action,  cocbined with more  effective 
coordination of policies an:i  with a  greater Jteasure  of  solidarity, 
and this systematic org::miza.tion of an effective dia.lo.gt:.e,  arc the  . 
< . 
best w~ in which to allay the fears associated with the ricidity 
ot the system  8Zld  also the fear that it ma::~ have  an inflatio:t:.:ll"l' 
or detlationar,y impact. 
'l'he  new  indicator has,  of course,  a.rouned.  cuch discuscion.  It 
has been argued,  for e:xacple,  that we  should have  opted for a  ::ore 
automatic system.  I  do not 6hare this view.  Only  a.n  ar.alysi3  of 
the facts makes  it possible to asse=s the cause of the  strair~, 
their extent and  the best w~  of correcting them.  W:~t to :e see:s 
essential is the strength of the  presucption,  the  ~portance 
attached to basic solutions as  opposed  to a  s~ple reflex re~por~e 
to events on  the market  and,  final~, the decision to review the 
working of the indicator after cix months  so as to  ~cess whether 
it ia tultilling ita complex role  effective~  • 
. 
' 
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~  70u will have  noted,  I  have  atte:pted to show  what  guarantees 
of order~ functioning the monetar,y  system itself offers. 
These  gUarantees are, first of nll, technical or.en,  r:.::.cl:r 
mobilization of sufficient  ~~s to  co~bnt spcculntion,  ~cvisi=~ 
tor preventive  ~easured,  estnb!i3r~cr.t of ~achinery to rc~c~ tt~ 
causes of strains.  Finally the arrangement goc s _further than a  mere 
agreement  on excha."lge  rate:J concluded between central  b:.r~:.s  in providing 
for  the uae of do:rc::.tic  x::.cr.e1..;..:·:r  s.."Xl  econo:ic policy 
instruments,  including,  where  necessar~, those within the  cp~cre 
ot competence  of the governments  themselves. 
A fUrther guarantee is afforded b,y  the flexibility of tte cy5te:, 
which reodily permito  Ch<J.l'le'OS  in central rates as a  s.u"ety valve 
AD!  not a  mere  convenience. 
Thil analysis, however,  calls for three concluding re:arks: 
- first~, this system,  which  is more  comprehensive,  more  c~plex 
and  more  refined,  combining automatic mechcniccs  ar~ potential 
means  of action, mu.at  be  "got off the grouni".  It has still 
to undergo its baptism of fire and  difficulties - o~e of  t~e= 
un•xpected - are bound  to arise.  I  trust only - and  believe -
that ve have not failed to see where  the real issues will lie  • 
. 
t 
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- secondly,  the system will,  as  I  mentioned earlier,  have to 
operate within a  disturbed  interr~tional monetar,y  enviro~cnt 
an~ in . managing  it,  we  will have to take into a.ceou:rt 
the prospective developments in this field; 
.,. ' 
-finally,  exchange  rate stability must  correcpond to  eco~c:ic 
re.::~.lity.  This  rcm.::~.rk leado me  to our second objective: 
E-.Jro;-.c.1.n  mo~.;t.'!rY  CYr:tc!':'l  ."'.r·:?  in f-eet  r.0~:  the  tec!:.::ic.:~.l 
'  condition that it will reflect sufficiently ho~oceneous 
econaoic  policies and  perfor~ce, and the political cc:!ition 
that it will help to solve the main  proble:~a coufrontir.g 
Europe's  aeon~. 
(a) In this :field,  the :firs·c;  pr;.ori  ty i::.  to coord.im.tc  eco::o::.ic 
policies. 
between  European currencies will not be stable  eno~;!l. 
the flexibility \'6ich  I  have  just referred to,  the :::.:s  ...rill ba 
meaningful  only if. parity char.fc:es  are reasonably ra.re  a.nd.  re!'lect 
only objective trends.  It this is not  the case,  there will ba no 
area of monetar,y  stability in Europe,  but  stoply a  cysteo of 
periodically recording variatlons.  In the lon:; run,  stable 
exch.a.nit:e  rate relationships can be safeguarded. only th:o'U(;h  t::.e 
convergc;;'lf;a  o:f  economic  performances ,that is to say by brir..cing 
down  inflation rates and bf achieving satisfactory balance of 
payments positions. 
-----------------------------·. 
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However,  although convergence  is expresned  in terma  of  fic~co n:~ 
performance,  it depends  on  the  joint definition and  moni~orir~ of 
objectives and  policies, that is to a~  on  coordination.  F.ow 
would  it be  possible for countries to take  p~t in the  cc=-c  cxcr.~~~ 
rate oystem  while at the ccr.c  time  continuir~ to  pur~uc differ~~! 
•  •  'C'  f 
monetary,  budcctary ani other policies?  The  ~.~ ~u~~  thc~cfo=c 
be  complemented  b,y  a  converccnce  of  econo~ic policy  cxtcr~i~~ to 
the main fields of macroeconomic  policy and  to the cain inct~cntal 
.  . 
' 
This means  that coordination will have  to be  much  more  syste:a~ic 
than at present and  will have  to take  place before major  natior~l 
decisions  like~ to influence  exchnneo rate relatio~~hips are actually 
taken.  It menns  that the dcfini  tion of domestic conctnry policif-:,, 
while continuing to be  the responnibility of  goverr~ents or  ce~tral 
banks, will become  a  matter of c~on  concern and  will have  to be 
treated as such. 
We  have  three assets at our  di~posal for  imple:cnting this  prcc,r<-~e: 
the awareness,  which was  expressed during the  prep~atcry wcrk,  of 
the logical connection between monetary system ani economic  policies; 
. 
' 
___________  ........ ___  .......... . recent erpcricnco of concerted acnr.ooic action,  y,;hich  h~ led.  u;;  tc 
strencthon our procodurao  ar4 to  bro~th new  life into tho  va:io~ 
bodieo which  work  out  the  bccir~in~ of a  Co==~~ty ccono:ic ;olicy; 
and  fi~lly, in the light of  the~e facts,  and  rclyin~ on  thi~ icp~oved 
cnpa.ci ty for  m<l.lla~ng our affairs, the natural concern to c:lke  the 
major political initiative a  lasting success.  I  do  not overestica.te 
.,.  ' 
·  these factors.  However,  bearing in mind  the events or 1978  as I  sa~ 
them,  I  believe they are ver,y  strong. 
I  would  like to make  a  few  additional pointo.  The  first is tha~  . 
integration is alre<ldy well developed  between cert:rin l!.e::1bcr  State::. 
It is thcz·efore  not  something entirely new  nor a.  le~p into  ~!-.e  u:-.:.:::.or.':'l. 
The  question is whether the process will  ju.st keep coinz icpe:-!'ectl.:r, 
covering only part of the field and co:::prisin.; or.l;r  co::e  of t!:c  !.:._::';;cr 
States, or whether it c:ust  include all nine  r.:c~bcr Sb.tes :.:.::d.  'ca  t.:!.l-:cn 
a  stage further along· the road towards  joint for:ula.tion o!'  polici~~. 
The  second point  I  would like to m;::Xe  is this.  Coordin.:1tion  ::..=pl::..e::. 
constr:rints..  However,  refu::::al  to accept  con:.:traints,  t~r.c!  t~c.:;c  c::::.;!:::...::..:.t:; 
in particular,  always  recults in more  inflation ar~ co~e ~~=~loj7.~~-: 
in the long term.  With or without  a  mor~ta.r~ sy~tem,  ea.c~  co~t~J cu::::t 
comply with th9se c,,nstraint  s. 
My third point is that coordination docs not cea.n  a  t:-:.o.ncfer  of  pc~-<~r::. 
There is lOA')  {['H~stion whatsoever of encroaching on  anyone's  pc;.:crs 
ot action.  What  is needed,  d~il'l&' the initial ~::.e, is to C.evelop 
• 
-·-···  --~  . 
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conoultntion~, to !lChiCVO  a  dcr_;rco  Of  policy into.:ro.tion u,rd.  o.l=o 
ot mutual  franknc~s,  so tho.t  co.ch  co~~try c~  to.ke ita  o~~ dcc:=ic~~ 
in full knowled&e  of the intentions,  objectives and.  policies o! the 
others. 
lbvinc said thic,  let me  be q,lite cleo.r about  one thing:  r.cit!:cr 
the procedures that  we  develop,  nor the corto.inty tho.t  t!:c~c is 
a  co~n~~ity of intcrcot,  nor the  fo~ce of  ~oneto.rJ  con~t~~intc c~ 
act  ao  a  substitute for cleo.rly defined  ~tio:nl policio3 or t!:e 
conocnoua  on  which  t~cy munt~bc bo.ood.  Ho\iCVer,  the Co::_-::·..mity 
co.n  help to foster  a~rcne~~, it co.n  help to develop a  cc~-::cn 
assessment  of problcl:ls  (reco[;nition of the need to be co:::;:-·:!titive, 
of the requirements  of co=petition,  of the need for  ~occ~o.ticn o! 
incomes  growth and the crucial role of cocbatir.g inflation),  ~d 
it can take positive,  and  indee~  I  ~elieve,  essential  ~easu:es 
to supplement  national action.  \ 
(b) This need. for coordination Which  is inevitably i=plied by the 
E~S goes hand in ho.nd  with a  political condition,  ~ich ic its 
locical counterpart.  The  D·!S  is a  basic clement  in  ovcr~ll econo=ic 
policy;  not  only muot  it not  have the effect  of unduly  curbi~ 
gro~"'th in }.;ember  States ...mooe  currencies o.re  under  prc~ZJu:c,  it  ~'.!Ct 
also prove its ability to help solve the probleoa  of growth  and 
employment.  Hence  the importance  of cnz::uring  th::1.t  concc:-te:! action 
beco:nos  a  per:ta.nent  feature;  this will  rr.o.ke  it pcs:::i":llc,  ~!:.::-o.;z!l 
th.e multiplier effects of sy:::etrically balanced. :.::ea.::;ures,  to  ;:~o·1i:.e 
some  countries with an additional boost to  gro·~h,  witho~t  af~e:ti~ 
the stability of the others.  Concerted action i3 the  =~a~3  o~ 
using our interdependence to obtain more  erowth and  lc~3  inflatio~ in 
the Community.  It is therefore an essential ele:nent  in the ~e. 
At  the same  time,  it is an aspect  of the general  principle of 
aolido.rity which  is also a  necessary complement  to the  E:.:s.  T:.e 
principle of solido.rity takes two _::;;U.n__forrz:::::  in its con·.r.::::ltio!"'..:l.l 
sense,  it applies directly to the  ch.,r_ing  o{__j.~_e  bg_~~!l_q .~~co.te.Q.,_by 
·  ~h~ cystem.  The  aim  muot  be to en::;ure  that no  ~.:cr:::.er  Sto.::e  i::: 
forced to leave the syster.1. because it is ur.a.ble  to be<>.r  cons-;~.:.ints 
'  .  which  have temporarily becoce too great;  it is only  r~t~al t~at 
the members  of a  tea.mzho'.lld. z::3.ke  an effort to rally roi.:.."li  a  ;..:.:"'7..:::c::- t.'::o 
ia in di!£iculties:  this effort is reflected in the  Co==~~ty's machinery ftr providing aid,  such  a~ medium-term  fir~nci~l 
assiot~nce and balance or payccnta loans, the role of ~~ich ic to 
enable a  Member  State in difficulties to overco:e its proble=s 
1Chile  remD.ining  in the syctem. 
i  •  .,.  ~ 
Solidarity must  also take on a  new  acpect  t~t is  lir~:cd to  t~e 
mture of the cystem.  The  EJ,:;  ~nnot develop  cucccccf'.lll:f in t!".e 
long run unless it is accompanied  by  har::loniz.:1.tion  of_ production  .  . 
and trnding condi  ti,ono,  that is to  0.:1.y  h.:J.r:nonization of  str-~ct1::e:::: 1 
between the Member  States participating in it.  rr.~ere the  eco~~=!c 
weakneos  of a  Member  State is due  to  i~cquate dcvelop=e~t of 
technology and infractructures, or where  there is not su!ficier.t 
capital available to fin.:1.nce  the necessary investment,  ~~e 
Community  must  help to  overco~c nuch  problccs.  It ~n  do  co, 
firstly by providing the nece;:;r:.2.ry  capi  ti:i.l,;  the  Co=::u..?J.i ty'  ~ 
structural  instru:ncnts are developir.g rapidly a.r.d  ~n  pl<:.y a 
growing role.  Secondly,  the Cot:"J:v.ni ty can help the  !~c=bcr :ta.tco 
concerned to fit their selective projects into properly  inte~ated 
progr~es Which  will provide a  general and political  !ra:c~ork 
for speci:f:i..c  schemes  and will  er.:.::ure  that the Flcasures~  taken are 
along the right lines, i.e. contribute to the coC.ernization of 
structures and  convergence~  Solvir~ the~e problc:s would  cr~i~~ 
the Cool::l'l.Ul.i ty as a  whole and.  would  rcpre3cnt  a.n  investment in the 
fUture;  it is an essential 8.$pect  of the ~. 
t 
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At  the samo  tioe,  I  a.m  opposed to indi:::crimimte tran::for::  dc:i~::d 
to fi~nce connumption or to ma~k economic  divergences  tc=~or:lrily 
without  tackling their roots.  Such  tran:::fers,  based on  t~e 
feeling that the rich countries will  pay,  would mean  a.  net 
"' 
impoverishment  tor the Cocmunity  which  would  sooner or la~er becc:e 
iDtolerable. 
I  apologize for having spoken at  such  length on  questions  with  Ahich 
everyone is familiar and for having  a?p.:~.rently loO.ndered  a.WJ.y  fro:z1 
the subject  on  which  I  'loO.S  supposed to talk.  However,  if I  did so, 
it 110s  to illustrate the subject better.  The  E:·!S  and its 
necessary associated aspects,  namely  pol1cy  coo~dimtion,  econo~ic 
convercence and solidarity,  carry a  momentum  ~~ich goc3  well  bcyo~d 
the strictly monetary fracework.  If the  Eli!S  is to  re=..:~.in stable 
and lasting,  the whole  range of instrumental,  ~croeconomic and 
medium-term  policies mUGt  gi~d~lly be integrated.  Tl::.is  is ,..,.,.t 
la a~  by the march  towards_ economic  and monetary union  • 
. 
t 
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IV  - I  now  come  to the po3sible wnys  in which  the cystc: :ight 
develop.  They  are difficult to foresee because they will, in large 
measure,  depend  on  the wey- in which the system  operate::s.  In the 
,  I10l"mal  course of events, develop::.cnts might  take three main directior.s: 
e-' 
1.  The  present arrangements for depo3iticg reserves could be 
transformed into a  Cozmnuni ty reserve syste:n . managed  ·.  by 
the f!I.CF; 
2.  ECU  could be  created  agair~t the  depo~it of  natior~l  .  .  . 
currencies  and  no  loneer  ag~inst the  depo~it of gold  ~~ 
foreign  exchar~ reserves alone, with  implicatio~ for the 
conditionality of such creation; 
3•  The  ECU  could gradually tcl:e  on  the role of an  in.:.tr-..;;::c::t 
tor settling private  trar~~~tions and  of a  reserve  curre~y, 
and  thus no  longer  ne~e o~~ as a  ~~ana of  settle:cn~ 
between central bankse 
(  !:  ·~ h~ .. (), \{  '""· 
I  will not go  into  .more.-dcw..ils  these· three  points. 
I  would,  however,  point out that theoe three  develo~ento would  ~ve 
the same  point of convergence,  n;:.::cly the  develop::e::t  of a.  sy~tc: 'trc.'lC.lj 
based on the multilateralization of bilateral relations - into a  system buih 
. 
• ....  t  ' 
• 
...  ·t  II- ...... 
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poles,  and  ~  stron~ common  centre, 
arO'Iml strong national  the E:-:CF  or a:v oT.her  body  that  t,ce~e t:e.e 
focal point ot the now  European :or..etary  organi:~tion ·• 
Where  credits are coneerned, 4rawir.e rights on  a  fund  ~ould rep:~e 
It is also  possible that 
ceili~ for swap  credits.  The  ECU  will no  lor-t;er  be  E;crcly  t-"l 
inst~ent for carrying out calculations but a  rezerve  i~t~e~t, 
ranking with gold,  foreign exch::.r.co  n.r.d  SDRs •.  \nd 1 know that there  is 
nothing to  prove  that thc·creation of a  European r:eserve  currency  . 
will be desirable. i'a.m well  aware that those seemingly technical 
developments  would,  in fact,  be a  truly revolutionary  step. 
I  am  also aware  that, if such develop:::ents  are  to take 
place, the E:I.S  must,  durir.g its trar.sitional pha.:Je,  pcrforc 
aatisfa.ctoril-3 in the eyes of all those takil".g  p:u-t.  I  will be  t:.e 
tirat to admit  that there is no  a.d.v.:ulce  guara."ltee  of auccc:::::.  ?..:.t 
a  failure would  be both the concequence  ar.d  the  ca~=e ot c~re:e 
difficulties in Europe  and  I  ~  convinced that there is no 
alternative to succesa. 
V - As  I  mentioned earlier, succcco depends  in p~t on  the  relatio~=hi? 
which can be  established,  in the  im=cdiate  future  arA  in t:e.e  lo~~ ter:, 
between Eu.ropean currencies,  a..U  I  am  thir.kir.g here of all E-.=o:;:-e.::..-1. 
currencies,  including  sterlir~.  I  hope  that the  Cnitc~ Ki~~c=, ~~ic~ 
is a  signatory to the system, will be  able to take  p~~  vc~J sc~n.  ~~c 
forging of this relationshit depends  in turn on  a  cwcepir~ =ove  tow~~~ 
integration in EUrope  in the different areas to which  I  rc;cr=ed 
earlier.  !Ut success also depends  to a  l;;.rge  e:rtcnt on the 
relationship which will be established betlt:een  the syztc itself 
---!1!11~·:.:...•:..:··=-:...·  .:..;··:.:...··;:..·!_.;'  ·::......:·..:.·-=-:.::~~-----~~-·-·-·~·.~--:··  ..... --·----.--.  ~·-·-"·~·-·_·  ::.------------_-_-::_-=:.."':...•------------.:..-~:~  ..  -.~  .. :-. - •:1  -
and the interr.a.tional monetary system, and in particular the 
dollar.  ~he emereence  in Europe  of a  zone of monetary stability 
1a in no  ~Y  an indication tlmt the Community  wiches to t~e a 
stand agninot  tho United States but it docs  me~ that, in order to 
'!I  0'; 
defend this stability, Europe  must  enter into a  constructive 
dialogue with its major partners on the future ot the interm.tioml 
monetary system. 
.  •• 
Thia ansumes,  first of all, that 
non-member  countries with 
similar interests  tr:hich  play an important role in world affair:>  could be 
associated to that venture. 
I  will not attecpt to list the countries which,  ac provided for in 
the Bremen  Couununiqu~, shouJ.d,  if they so wi.ch,  be  pcr::i  tted. to 
do so.  I  am  convinced,  however,  th~t it is in 
the Community's  interests to cooperate  clo~ely with the other 
countries in Europe;  it is by no  means  my  intention to propose  t~e 
settirJ& up  of a  bloc but to strengthen the ba.se  of the :E:·:S  a.r.d. 
thereby to  increa~e ita chances of success. 
Implementation of the  Er-~ is linked to the strer.(rther.ir.g of the 
international monetary syctcm;  its durability will largely eepc~ 
on ita capacity to contribute to this objective  • 
. 
• 
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The creation of the  EMS  has,  as such,  a  positive role to play in ~~e 
development  of the international monetary system;  it sho;.."3,  first 
ot all, that there exists in the world a  group of countries - and 
atrong countries at that - Which  is dissatisfied with the present 
disorder and which  no longer accepts that  exchance  rates  ~r.ould be 
allowed to fluctuate ~bitrar~~y.  ~r  from  facilitati~ the 
international adjustment  process,  the system  of fluctuating  exc~~~e 
rates has in part hampered it;  apart  from  the oil-proC.uci!lg 
countries and the sub-redistribution ~ich has taken place in  ~~ope, 
the breakdown  of the major groups  of  ~o~~tries into creditors a:d 
\ 
debtors has remained the same  as in the early seventies;  fu.~her:ore, 
the scale of intervention on  foreign exchange  ~rkets has been  ~uch 
greater than under the system of stable exchange  rates,  and this lus 
exacerbated the problem  of liquidity,  which  the system  of fl~ct~~i~ 
rates was  supposed to alleviate.  In this respect,  the  E:!.~  thu~ 
represents a  fundamental  change  in attitudes,  i.e. tho  abandor~ent 
of the absolute belief in the virtues of fluctuatinG  excha~e rates 
~  conversely,  the certainty that stability,  a  factor conducive 
to growth,  is the result of strictness and discipline. 
Butthe  D~S also has a  direct  practical implication.  There is a 
tendency to attribute sole responsibility for the monetary disorder to 
the dollar but  we  should not forget  that a  number  of crises have 
beeu triggered by instability in Europe and not by disarray in P.=crica. It 
f'alla to us to eliminate this occasional cause of world.  i:lztabili  ty  • 
. 
• 
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You  will therefore excuse me  if I  resort to what  the Frer.ch call 
the "Coue method",  but  I  believe in the virtue of the p:-ecep""; 
set  out  in the doctrine of the Order of St  Dccinic,  ~ich state~ 
that "teaching is nothing wi-thout  e.x.:u:Jple";  at the rif:k or  . 
appearing .naive,  I  believe tr~t  deman~s for the restoration ot 
a  sound international order will carr,y more  weiBht  if Europe 
first sets the example,  by encouraging its p.-J.rtners to play 
their part too.]  Lastly,  the EY.S  possesses what  I  will tem a 
"diplomatic" force:  during 'lhe  tran~itior..:1.l  p."'lase  in tho 
development  of the internatiozul monetary aystcm  on  -..hich  wo  are 
now  embarking,  the  ~·~S presents Europe  wi.th  an opportunity 
gradually to speak with  one  voice,  on at  lea.:Jt  equ:l.l  ter:s, 
and thua to dofond its ow. interests more effectively  • 
. 
I 
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apparent, with the collective awareness in induotrialized countries 
ot t~e urgent need tor closely coordinated action oeing or.e  of the 
mon  encouraging features of recent yea.rs  • 
.. ' 
(a) The  first of these directions concerns moves  to  co~bat,t~roucn 
intervention on  the markets,  exchange  rate movements  which  ~ave no 
economic  justification.  It is to be  poped that the decisions  .. 
taken last November  foreshadow  a  much  greater degree  of 
systematic cooperation between  major  monetary  groups  ai~ed at 
amplifying and diversifying the means  available for waging this 
combat.  They  are the manifestation of a  ver.y welcooe  co~on will 
and,  in the case of the United States, of a  better appreciation 
ot the dancers of monetary  instability.  As  a  monetary entity, 
the Community  can play a.  cajor role in this connection,  as do 
ao11111  ot its Member  States alrea.ey-. 
(b) The  second line of action concerns the forculation of national 
economic  policies that  a~e compatible with the obJective of 
international stability.  As  I  pointed out earlier, in t!:c  c.J.sc  of Europ~, 
the 
this will possibly be greatest challenge since it does not involve 
t 
ei=ple mechanisms  or the direct external constraint. .. _,  .  ·-
This can be helped by the more  systetlatic organization of t~e 
dialogue,  the joint consideration of docc~tic monet~ry policies, 
and the effective application or the  provisior~ giving the 
International Monetary Fund a  supervisory recpon~ibility.  In 
this connectior.,  I  ~.convinGPp that it is in Europc'o  intcrccts 
to help to strengthen tho  n~.  Just as we  arc tryir-& to or(;:lr.i::e 
ourselves,  on the  ~sis of accepted disciplinco and a  stror~or 
common  or~nization, so we  must  wish  for similar characteristics 
in the international system,  and so we  would  like to see a.t 
'  least part of What  we  have  cor~idered good for ourselves to be 
practised at international level. 
It will take time to develop this closeness of policies, this 
awareness  of the intermtioml effects of n.i.tior.al  decisior..s. 
However,  since there  i~ no  iz:ter:r.;.'l.tior~l  r!lOl"<etary  sy:::te:1  that 
would  impose,  through its own  techniques,  an oblicn,tion to re::rtore 
equilibria, this is th~~ road which must  be followed. 
(e) !he major question or the control or intermtior.al liquidity, 
and in particular of the Eurol'.:J."l,rkets,  is more  controversial.  l~r.y 
arguments  have  been used to oppose atte:pts at action in t~is area. 
In particular such action has been tcrced ur.neccc~~ry (the  rc~l 
source of the liquidity problem is said to be  ir~pproprinte r~tior~l 
policies),  ineffective, aru\ even dnnccrouo,  since the Euro::.:lrkctc 
have helped prevent, and are contirru.ing to help prevent,  serious 
disruptions eo:zmected  with la.otiZJg balance of pay::er.ts  d.iccquili"t:-ia.  • 
. ...  ·- --. ··--._--.,  .. -- ... ---------------~  ..... .._ ............. -.. - . <I>  -
-24-
I  believe however that  we  should look more  closely into t.."ly3  of 
drawing benefit from  the system  while avoiding its excecscs. 
After all, it is not  a  question of .establishing co~trols in the adverso 
sense or the word,  but,  as central banks  do  at  natio~41 level 
throughout the world,.of  sce~nc ways  of containing mc~cy cre~tio~ 
within limits which  ~re compatible with overall  equilibri~.  ?~is 
opens  ~p a  whole  field of thought,  and,  one  day,  of action,  ~ich 
I  believe to be important. 
(d) The !actors I  have  outlined,  tho~h inevitably not  eL~austive, 
show that in my  view any  pro~ess in the international monetary 
tield will depend  on  methodical  pursuit  of all the  po~sible ave~ues 
of approach,  which  are linked by the need for close  intcrnatio~~l 
cooperation.  I  do  not think we  should underesti.ltate the results 
that· can be obtained if joint action is sufficiently systc=atic, 
sufficiently continuous and,  of course,  on  a  sufficie~tly larc3 
scale,  for all action has its minimum  threshold of  effectivc~e~s. 
ls I  have said,  I  am  certain that the will to achieve monetary 
union in Europe,  seen as a  means  of participating more  fully in 
necessary joint action,  is a  valuable factor contributing to the 
success of  sue~ action.  It will  streno~hen the multi-polar 
nature ot the world economy.  What  I  do  not  know  of course is 
how,  iD detail,  the world system  will  evolve and whether the 
trend towards  ~t  is a  particular aspect  within this ::ulti-pola:-
. 
eyatam - the trend to"Wa.rds  th'e use of a  larger nu::ber  of re:::erve  C'..l.'"!'I!:C.Cic:::  -~-
will become  stronger, thus in the long term  r::Ldie;).lly  clklr.eir,e 
the features ot the interrotior..:ll  monetary sy:::tc::.  Per!-..::.p:::  or.e 
day we  will see the ECU  pl<:lyir.g  an intermtiorol role,  't~t  t!:~t 
day has not yet  coce.  We  need tice to fir=ly  e~~a.blic~ t~e r.c~ 
•  ~  '0'  I 
European  cche~e, to docido on how  it &ho~d develop arA  to a~~c=3 
\lhether the ECU,  having perforced the role expected of it, ea.n. 
fulfil new  fUnctions. 
One  thing I  am  sure of is that the present period is fir=t  ar~ 
foremost,  whether we  like it or not,  a  period of  connoli~tion 
and  or~nization that  involves much  difficult work  but  is 
absolutely nececsa.ry.  'Witho·,:t  indulginc too much  in idc::Llictic 
daydrc~s, we  must  endeavour to develop effectively the link3 
between the major economic  areas,  a.r~ to build a  ~~o;~n  =yste~ 
which  will in itself be a  f'ador of equilibriu.::,  <ln  ex  ... !""plc  of 
discipline which  is both voluntary and organized,  a  contribution 
to the world order and the baois for Europca.n union  • 
. 
t 
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